HARASSMENT OF MALE BECAUSE HE WAS EFFEMINATE AND DID NOT MEET A MALE STEREOTYPE IS HARASSMENT “BECAUSE OF SEX” THAT VIOLATES TITLE VII
On Monday, July 16, 2001, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court, 2-1,
ruled that discrimination and harassment of a male because he did not meet
the harassers’ view of a male stereotype constitutes discrimination and
harassment “because of sex”. The harassment involved an allegedly
“relentless campaign” of references to the male plaintiff in female terms,
mocking him for walking and carrying his tray “like a woman,” and taunts
with vulgar sexual references that included references to his perceived
sexual orientation. The court took the bold step of reversing a trial
court’s factual findings on hostile work environment (after a non-jury
trial).
The Circuit Court’s decision also dealt with two aspects of the employer
liability rules, under both the
Faragher and
Ellerth
affirmative defense pertaining to employer liability for harassment by
supervisors and standards for liability for co-worker harassment. First, the
Court confirmed that the affirmative defense does not apply to co-worker
harassment, noting again that an employer is liable if it “knew or should
have known” of the co-employee harassment but failed to take prompt and
appropriate remedial action. Second, the Court found liability because, in
response to a complaint to management, the complainant was told to
report-back if there were further problems, and the employer did not
investigate, discuss the allegations with the perpetrators, or demand the
co-employees stop their harassment. The Court was also critical of the
employer’s position that the plaintiff failed to report harassment because
he had not complained to corporate as the employer’s anti-harassment policy
required; the plaintiff had complained to local management, which violated
the reporting policy.
The Court majority found the employer also liable for the supervisor
harassment, to which the affirmative defense applies. The Court held the
employer had satisfied only part of the first prong of the affirmative
defense (requiring reasonable efforts to prevent and correct harassment), by
distributing an appropriate policy and providing training. However, the
employer’s failure to investigate or admonish the perpetrators was not
adequate on the “correction” arm of the first prong, rendering the employer
liable as well for the supervisory sexual harassment.
Incorporating as it does the “sexual stereotype” as
a prohibited basis of harassment, this decision is a reminder that, in responding
to harassment complaints and training employees and managers, employers should broadly
interpret their anti-harassment policies to investigate and remedy as much
harassment as possible. This case also serves to reinforce the need to
investigate and take documented action to discipline and/or admonish
harassers that is appropriate for the offense.
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,
No. 99-35579 (9th Circ. July 16, 2001).